Musgrave’s Model of Public Expenditures

With The help of Musgrave’s model, it is shown that government intervention is necessary for the efficient provision of public goods.

Musgrave’s Theory of Public Expenditures

Musgrave has recognized three essential roles of the government in an economy that is allocation, distribution and stabilization.

The allocation role of the government is to allocate resources for the optimal production of the public good, which would not be provided efficiently by the private players in society.

The distributive role of the government is to ensure the optimal distribution of income and wealth, which might not be in market provision. This role ensures equitable distribution of the efficiency which is required in a society.

The stabilization function of the government ensures that the macroeconomic variables of employment, output and prices are being produced and maintained at a stable rate. This arena of the role of government is macroeconomic; it is hence more of fiscal policy for an economy rather than only a theory of public finance. Thus, the public theory deals with the allocation and distributive role of the government.

Under Musgrave’s model, policies to adjust the inter-individual or household distribution of a nation’s income and wealth- that is, the distribution function- also accrue to the centre. This is because the full (assumed) mobility of both the rich and the poor between subnational entities makes it impossible for one such government to have more generous policies towards the poor than others if it has to finance these policies itself, be it only at the margin. Either the poor will move in, overloading the expenditure side and thus requiring higher taxes, or the rich will move out, starving the revenue side, or both will happen simultaneously.

A subnational government could have pro-rich policies to encourage the outmigration of the poor, but this would be undesirable from an overall allocative perspective. This would lead to segregation and, thus, to a reduction in the externalities that emerge from mixing in a given territory of various groups. However, there are costs associated with mobility.

In small countries (Belgium, for example), differences in ethno-linguistic-religious characteristics between subnational entities could reduce mobility from one jurisdiction to another one. In large countries, distance and its associated costs may be a barrier to mobility even if there are no differences in these characteristics. Thus it is conceivable to have some income distribution at the sub-national level.

Musgrave’s particular interpretation of the theory of public finance is regarding the non-excludability of the members. Non-exclusion from the consumption of a public good causes free riding to occur, which leads to preference-revelation problems. This first instance of market failure can be combined with a second one. When goods are non-rival, their free availability to everyone – made possible only through public provision – is socially desirable (Pareto improving). In retrospect, it is obvious that this policy recommendation rests on the assumption of a benevolent government (that does not fail).

Under Musgrave’s model, policies adjust the inter-individual / household distribution of a nation’s income and wealth; that is, the distribution function also comes under the functions of the centre. This is because the movement of poor and rich between the subnational grounds makes it impossible for one government to have more generous policies towards the poor than others if it has to finance these policies itself. The poor will move in, overloading of the poor, but this would be undesirable from the migration of the poor, but this would lead to segregation and thus to an overall allocative perspective.

The costs associated with the movement with mobility could reduce mobility between the jurisdictions. The efficiency argument of the allocative policy is the traditional for the subnational role. Efficient provision of the public good requires only subnational activity. Indeed, that is not the case. Some social goods, such as national defence, public health, courts, etc., are geographically limited but have nationwide benefits.

The recognition that allocative function is an intergovernmental responsibility applies not only to broad functions of services but also within the functions. Education is a good example here. A nation as a whole has a strong interest in a well-educated population as it does the locality where the service is provided.

There are four criteria for assigning functional responsibilities across types of governments:

(a) Economies of Scale: varies across goods and services. Economies of scale are significant in broadcasting, where additional units per viewer drop when the number of viewers of a given program doubles but is negligible in the provision of individual health services such as surgical treatment. The existence of economies of scale constitutes an argument for a regional government to provide a particular good or service.

(b) Heterogeneity of Preferences and Circumstances: groups living in different parts of a country may display strong heterogeneity of preferences or may face different environments in terms of climate and topography. They may prefer and need different amounts of services and different qualities, too. Decentralization is appropriate to address these needs if these groups are separated by borders that match those of sub-national governments.

(c) Presence of Externalities: negative or positive externality has an impact on the distribution of public goods. If some activities of one government have significant external effects on the individual or business located in another jurisdiction or on other government types, then these activities should be well coordinated among the affected governments.

(d) Emulation: Also referred to as competition, which helps increase the introduction of best practices in government requires at least two and introduce best practices in government, requires at least two or more units in a given activity. This argument is for the decentralization of government activities.

Read More in: Theory of Public Finance

  1. Public Finance: Meaning, Nature & Scope
  2. Role of Government in Economy
  3. Role of Government in Mixed Economy: Public & Private Sector
  4. Role of Government under Cooperation and Competition
  5. Role of Government in Economic Development and Planning
  6. Concept of Public Goods, Private Goods, and Merit Goods
  7. Concept of Market Failure and Functions of Government
  8. Market Failure and Functions of Government: Decreasing Costs
  9. Market Failure and Functions of Government: Externalities
  10. Market Failure and Functions of Government: Public Goods
  11. Future Market: Meaning, Role & Uncertainty
  12. Concept of Information Asymmetry
  13. Theory of Second Best: Concept & Explanation
  14. Problem of Allocation of Resources: Public & Private Mechanisms
  15. Preferences: Meaning, Types & Problems of Preference Revelation
  16. Preference Aggregation & Its Mechanism
  17. Voting Systems, Direct Democracy, Representative Democracy, Leviathan Hypothesis & Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
  18. Economic Theory of Democracy: Concept & Explanation
  19. Politico Eco Bureaucracy: Concept & Explanation
  20. Rent-Seeking and Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities
  21. Rationale for Public Goods: Concept & Explanation
  22. Benefit Theory or Voluntary Exchange Theory
  23. Lindahl Model: Concept, Equilibrium & Limitations
  24. Bowen Model: Concept, Advantages & Limitations
  25. Samuelson’s Model of Public Expenditure
  26. Musgrave’s Model of Public Expenditures
  27. Demand Revealing Schemes for Public Goods
  28. Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
  29. Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
  30. Tiebout Model: Concept, Assumptions Equilibrium & Simple Tiebout Model
  31. Theory of Club Goods
  32. Keynesian Principles of Stabilization Policy
  33. Difference Between Keynesian Economic Thought and Others
  34. Role of Expectations and Uncertainty in Formulating Stabilization Policy
  35. Intertemporal Markets Efficiency & Failure
  36. Liquidity Preference Theory
  37. Diamond-Dybvig Banking Model
  38. Preference Shocks, Adverse Selection & Central Bank
  39. Equilibrium Deposit Contract
  40. Social Goods and Its Effect on Stabilization Policy
  41. Effect of Infrastructural Facilities on Stabilization Policy
  42. Effect of Distributional Inequality on Stabilization Policy
  43. Effect of Regional Imbalances on Stabilization Policy
  44. Wagner’s Law of Increasing State Activities: Explanation, Graph & Criticism
  45. Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis: Explanation, Graph & Criticism
  46. Public Expenditure: Concept, Objectives, & Public vs Private Expenditure
  47. Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
  48. Structure & Growth of Public Expenditure in India
  49. Trends, Lessons & Priorities in Public Expenditure in India
  50. Social Cost-Benefit Analysis: Project Evaluation, Estimation of Costs & Discount Rate
  51. Performance Based Budgeting and Zero Based Budgeting
  52. Theories of Tax Incidence: Concentration Theory, Diffusion Theory & Modern Theory
  53. Tax System and Its Principles
  54. Equity Principle and Efficiency Principle of Taxation: Meaning, Explanation & Examples
  55. Ability to Pay and Benefits Received Principle of Taxation
  56. Theory of Optimal Taxation: Excess Burden & Distortions of Taxation
  57. Deadweight Loss of Taxation: Causes, Measurement & Example
  58. Concept of Equity & Efficiency in Economics
  59. Trade-Off Between Equity and Efficiency: Meaning & Example
  60. Theory of Measurement of Dead Weight Loss
  61. Double Taxation: Meaning, Desirability, Forms & Solution
  62. Solution to Problem of Double Taxation: Intra-Country & International
  63. Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and Indian Policy
  64. Classical View on Public Debt
  65. Compensatory Aspect of Public Debt Policy
  66. Public Debt or Borrowings: Concept, Need, Sources & Types
  67. Concept of Public Debt or Public Borrowings
  68. Need for Public Debt or Public Borrowing
  69. Sources of Public Debt
  70. Classification of Public Debt
  71. Burden of Public Debt: Meaning, Types & Explanation
  72. Debt Through Created Money or Deficit Financing
  73. Public Debt (Public Borrowings) and Inflation (Price Level)
  74. Crowding Out of Private Investment and Activity
  75. Principle of Public Debt Management and Debt Repayment

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